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I. INTRODUCTION
The political transformations of the last two decades-the fall of
dictatorial regimes of various ideological stripes, the resolution of longrunning internal armed conflicts, the rise to global predominance of liberaldemocratic political values, and the decline of the principle of state
sovereignty (which had attributed to the state the ultimate word on public
order in a given territory at a given time)-have prompted new efforts, both
within states and within the international system, to hold individuals
personally accountable for violent acts that they committed under the
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putative authority of their state.' One aspect of these efforts is the growing
phenomenon of retrospective and extraterritorial criminal prosecutions-that
is, prosecutions carried out by a legal order other than that in effect at the
time and place of the acts in question.' These prosecutions may be carried
out in a new post-transition legal system of the country within which the
acts took tlace, in a foreign Legat systettt eetcisinag ex-trateritirtal
(including universal) jurisdiction, or in an international (or mixed) tribunal.3
From one perspective, such prosecutions are the closest that a legal and
political endeavor can come to representing moral clarity: a struggle to
establish the supremacy of humane values over tyranny and terror. These
prosecutions are undertaken both to impose judgment on perpetrators of
past deprivations of human dignity (the "settling of accounts") and to
reinforce a systemic commitment, at both the national and international
levels, to future adherence to human rights standards (the vow of "never
again"). Their pursuit is thus perceived consistently to hold the moral high
ground, as against formalistic legal obstacles and expedient political
compromises that have the effect of perpetuating "impunity." Such a view
ascribes to the legal scholar a primary mission to find ways of expanding the
scope of international criminal justice; fixing the limits of that expansion
appears as a low priority, if not a kind of mischief.
From another perspective, however, retrospective and extraterritorial
prosecutions are, by their nature, fraught with moral, legal, and practical
ambiguity. To the extent that they target, not merely the gratuitous cruelties
of armed thugs, but ruthless acts animated by the hopes and fears of
broader constituencies, such prosecutions test a number of boundaries:
between impartially enforcing universal standards and pillorying politically
1. There is a vast recent literature covering such efforts, under the rubric of "transitional
justice." For some overviews of the issues, see generally MARTHA M1NOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998); RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF
LEGAL ORDER (David Dyzenhaus, ed., 1999); TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND:
FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM (1995); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (1999); TRANSITIONAL JLJSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW INNEW DEMOCRACIES
(James McAdams, ed., 1997).
2. Other aspects of transitional justice include, as alternatives or complements to
criminal prosecution, devices such as "truth and reconciliation commissions," reparation
programs, civil damage suits, and "histration" of complicit officials from the state apparatus.
3. See generally Chandra Lekha Sriram & Brad R. Roth, eds., Symposium: Justice
Without Borders? Externalizing CriminalPunishmentfor PastAtrocities, 12 FINNISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 3-189 (2001).
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disfavored causes; between observing legal constraints and insisting on
"material justice"; between reaffirming the dignity of a conflict's victims
and humiliating the partisans of the losing side; between establishing a
foundation for future voluntary cooperation and coercing a renunciation of
deeply-held commitments; between righteously upholding the norms of an
international order and officiously meddling in another community's internal
affairs. From this perspective, moral judgments about inhumane acts must
yield in some measure to moral considerations of a different nature, such as
a commitment to structures and processes designed to cope with the
persistence of moral dissensus in a complex and conflict-prone world. On
this account-from which the present article proceeds-establishing limits
to retrospective and extraterritorial criminal prosecution is indispensable to
the legitimacy of the enterprise.
The clash of perspectives on retrospective and extraterritorial criminal
justice is frequently obscured by the uncontroversially-monstrous nature of
the most familiar targets of such prosecutions. Even in the more restrictive
view, many of the recent developments in international criminal law properly
reflect the limits of the global order's pluralism. There can be little objection,
in principle, to the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
gross and systematic violations of the laws and customs of war. Such
crimes, properly delimited, cannot be rationalized as "exceptional" means
to plausibly legitimate ends, as they, by their nature, embody ends that have
been repudiated by the international community as a whole. Although global
enforcement plainly falls far short of the legal ideal of treating like cases
alike, this shortcoming alone seems insubstantial, so long as the elements of
the offenses reflect broadly-acknowledged standards, and so long as due
process is observed in adducing proof of individual responsibility.
Nonetheless, the breadth of the emerging licenses for the unilateral
implementation of supposedly universal norms, and of the rhetoric of the
drive against impunity more generally, necessitates looking beyond the most
outrageous and clear-cut instances of international crime. While genocide,
crimes against humanity, and gross and systematic violations of the laws
and customs of war are beyond the bounds of what any sector of the
international community can publicly adopt and rationalize, less spectacular
forms of ruthlessness are endemic to real-world political conflict, and are
often defended by respected figures as necessary measures. 4 Because
4. Note the shocking recent comments of Benny Morris, the (up to now) widelyadmired Israeli chronicler of acts of "ethnic cleansing" (his term for it) duringthe 1948 Arab-
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ruthless measures are directed against threats to what a particular project
of public order characterizes as a nation's vital interests, the criminality vel
non of those measures is frequently open to partisan assessment.' Indeed,
even the gravest established categories of crime, if loosely or tendentiously
construed,6 can be invoked to condemn participants on either side of most
7
artmed confwtcts .

Israeli war:
I don't think that the expulsions were war crimes. You can't make an omelette
without breaking eggs. You have to dirty your hands .... When the choice is
between destroying or being destroyed, it's better to destroy . . .. We are the
greater victims in the course of history and we are also the greater potential victim.
Ari Shavit, Survival of the Fittest, IIA'ARETZ, Jan. 9, 2004, availableat www.haaretz.com
(accessed from homepage by selecting Archives) (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
5. Robert S. McNamara has recently reminded us of grisly Allied measures in World
War II that decent liberal-democratic states (and their populations) have never repudiated:
We burned to death 100,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo-men, women, and
children.. .. [Air Force Gen. Curtis] Lemay said, "[i]f we'd lost the war, we'd
all have been prosecuted as war criminals." And I think he's right. He-and I'd
say I-were behaving as war criminals . ... What makes it immoral if you lose,
and not immoral if you win?
Samantha Power, War and Never Having to Say You'reSorry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003,
Sec. 2, at 1.
6. For an illustration of such a tendentious construction by a member of the European
Court of Human Rights, see the coricurringopinion of Judge Loucaides in Streletz, Kessler,
and Krenz v. Germany, 49 I.L.M. 773 (European Court of Human Rights 2001), in which
he deems the Berlin Wall shootings to qualify as a crime against humanity. Cf. Statute of the
XiM,
x' ;aA Cvmwak omi, A . l, 37k kL.M. 999 V.g99 t-& UXn\
MVM
,.,%.
,A
requires a "widespread or systematic attack directed against"a civilian "population"). Even
more loosely, the ICCPR Human Fights Committee proclaimed that "production, testing,
possession, [and] deployment," as well as the use, "of nuclear weapons should be prohibited
and recognized as crimes against humnanity." Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Life (Art. 6),
General Comment 14, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess. (1994).
7. The private criminal complaints brought in Belgian courts against Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Yasir Arafat are not merely illustrative, but
potentially archetypical. Whether or not the actions of either or both of these leaders fulfill
the elements of established international crimes, the complainants and their supporters are
unquestionably seeking to use judicial processes to further partisan agendas-in respect of
a conflict that, notwithstandingits high international profile, is very far fron amongthe most
violent taking place in the world. For thoughtful misgivings about the application of
universal jurisdiction to these and similar cases, see Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for
UniversalJurisdiction- OrIs It Only Two? 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES INLAW 199, 225-
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Broad licenses for retrospective and extraterritorial prosecutions
increase the scope for partisan assessments to operate in the name of
international legality, at the expense of those individuals unlucky enough to
find themselves subject to the jurisdiction of an unfriendly court. At its
worst, the transformation of human rights from shield to sword can lead,
paradoxically, to violations of human rights.
The 2001 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Streletz,
Kessler, and Krenz v. Germany,8 upholding Germany's post-unification

convictions of former East German high officials for the orders they gave
to border guards, is a troubling development in this regard. Although
nominally upholding the principle of nullum crimen et nulla poena sine

lege, the European Court effectively licensed holding former officials
accountable to a conception of justice at odds with the law applicable at the
time and place of their acts. By distorting legality to achieve what it
regarded as a human-rights-friendly outcome, the Court reinforced one of
the most worrisome aspects of the effort to subject state actors to
retrospective and extraterritorial prosecution.
The Krenz case is worthy of close examination, not because the
defendants (who, after all, ran a harsh dictatorship) have any personal claim
to the moral high ground, but because the guardians of human rights
themselves need to be guarded. Criminal prosecution, even where
undertaken in the name of human rights, is an exercise of immense power,
and not only over the lives of the individuals in the dock. The lure of
"material justice" is corrosive of the legal accountability on which the
preservation of freedom and human dignity ultimately depends. Moreover,
an authoritative characterization of adversaries, past and present, as
criminals has a wider political significance, undermining structures for future
cooperation and compromise with the non-like-minded. The extent to which
this risk is worth running for the sake of even a sound imposition of criminal
sanctions is debatable. Impositions of the sort upheld in the Krenz case, this
article will argue, are legally unsound, and should be avoided.
11. EAST GERMAN PUBLIC ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT

A legal assessment of acts committed under the authority of the East
German state must proceed from an appropriate understanding of the
26, 231-32 (2004).
8. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 (European Court of Human Rights 2001).
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normative context of that state's existence and functioning. From most of
the period leading up to 1989, the community of states was composed of
two ideologically-rival blocs nominally committed to "peaceful coexistence,"
and a third, "Non-Aligned" bloc of emergent (and mostly poorer and
weaker) states seeking to make real the promises of territorial integrity,
political independence, and sovereign equality to which the stronger states,
shopping for allegiance, paid lip service. Accordingly, the international legal
system of the era embodied a collective moral and political vision of

respectful cooperation among states bearing competing conceptions of just
public order. That system's pluralism, as articulated in the United Nations
Charter and developed through the subsequent interpretive practices of
states and intergovernmental organizations,9 required states to renounce
efforts to impose their own standards of justice within the territory of
foreign states.' 0
The moral (as opposed to the purely pragmatic) foundation of the
international system's pluralism was the presumption that states represented
the self-determination of the populations (qua political communities, or

"peoples") that they territorially encompassed." State officials, in turn,
9. Gerry Simpson has recently elaborated a contrast between "Charter liberalism," the
pluralist vision associated with the Charter, and the "liberal anti-pluralism" of a set of
leading U.S.-based international law scholars (i.e., Thomas M. Franck, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, W. Michael Reisman, and Fernando Tes6n). See Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12
EuR. J. INT'L. L. 537 (2001).
10. As Thomas M. Franck has put it, "nations have favored treating all states as
autonomous entities entitled to be left alone, and doing so on grounds of maintaining
international peace and order, rather than advancing justice." Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice
Relevant to the InternationalLegal System? 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 945, 955 (1989).
Franck drew from such observations, and more generally from the system's designation of
states rather than individuals as the primary units of analysis, the conclusion that justice is
not "among the indicators of legitimacy" in the international system, Id. at 962. This
conclusion is (or at least was in 1989) correct insofar as the liberal conception, or any
particular substantive conception, ofjustice is concerned; it is misleading to the extent that
it implies a straightforwardly amoral order.
11. See Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw ConcerningFriendlyRelations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
[hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration],G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124 UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) (affirming as an imperative "the
territorial integrity [and] political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples
...and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the

2004]

EAST GERMAN LEADERS CASE

derived their international authority not from their own power and will, but
from a presumption that they served as agents of the collectivities that they
purported to represent. Yet, notwithstanding the Charter's exhortations
regarding "human rights and fundamental freedoms,"' 2 that presumption
was not taken to be rebuttable in accordance with liberal political principles.
Rather, internal processes were typically accorded deference, even where
those processes offended liberal principles, 3 This deference represented
not an abandonment of the moral principle of popular sovereignty, but rather
an application of that very principle in the absence of shared assumptions
about popular sovereignty's substantive and procedural requisites. The
conventional wisdom held that empirical investigation to ascertain public
opinion in a foreign state is most often impracticable, that "popular will"
itself is a complex and normatively-loaded concept, and that any imposition
from abroad of procedures calculated to measure "popular will" is
presumptuous at best, and a usurpation at worst. 4
This wisdom was reinforced by the very nature of the Cold War, which
presented itself to the world as not merely a clash of powers, but a clash of
universal creeds. Liberal democracy and "people's democracy" represented
two complete and opposing conceptions of public order struggling for
adherence within all nations. Moreover, the intensity of the struggle allowed
for the paradoxical rationalization, on both sides, of dictatorial, repressive,
and even terroristic means to "democratic" ends. Expressions of principled
outrage at such means could easily be dismissed as-and indeed, frequently
amounted to-partisan propaganda.
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.").
12. Id.
13. In the words of the FriendlyRelations Declaration,supra note 11, "[e]very State
has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural systems,
without interference in any form by another State"; "[n]o State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State." Id. at 123. The Declaration's language parallels that of Article I
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "[a]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." InternationalCovenant on
CivilandPoliticalRights, GA. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm. 21 st Sess., 496th plen.
mtg. (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, Art. 1, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
14. See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

136-49, 160-71, 253-364 (1999).
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This is not to say that the international order's pluralism was
unbounded. The system resolutely excluded certain deviant governing
arrangements: Axis-era fascism from the start, and "alien, colonial, and
racist" regimes later on. 5 Nonetheless, it otherwise represented an
accommodation among radically differing conceptions of justice. The
international legal order combined overlapping consensus with modus
vivendi, a least-common-denominator morality with a prudential policy of
compromise. 16
Divided Germany symbolized the normative divide between East and
West. But while the early years of the Cold War had been marked by
dangerous superpower tensions over a divided Berlin, the situation stabilized
in the 1960s, not long after East Germany's 1961 construction of the Berlin
Wall to halt the flow of westward emigration. The reality of two German
states gradually came to be accepted by the opposing blocs, and in 1973,
both were admitted to the United Nations. Although West Germany was
never completely reconciled to East Germany's sovereign status (and
continued to confer automatic citizenship on East German arrivals to the
West), the international order regarded the sovereign equality of East
Germany as a legal fact, terminating only after the 1990 re-unification treaty
that followed the fall of the Communist regime.
III. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
The principle of nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege lies at the
very heart of the concept of the rule of law-so much so that it is
frequently referred to merely as "the principle of legality."' 7 Few measures
contradict the essence of legality so fully as the retroactive criminalization
of acts that violated no law applicable at the time and place of their
commission. Accordingly, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) demands that, "[n]o one shall be held guilty of
15. See Friendly Relations Declaration,supranote 11, at 122 ("subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination arid exploitation" is contrary to the Charter); Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Interventionand Interference in the InternalAffairs of States, G.A.
Res. 103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 91 st plen. mtg., at 78, 80 (1981) (non-intervention norms
shall not "prejudice in any manner the right to self-determination, freedom and independence
of peoples under colonial domination, foreign occupation or racist regimes .... ).
16. The contrast between" overlapping consensus" and "modus vivendi" derives from
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144-50 (1993).
17. See generallyANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 139-58 (2003).
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any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law [including
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations], at the
time when it was committed." ' Although the absence of international
criminal statutes makes inevitable some compromise of the associated
principle that the penalty, as well as the crime, be fixed in advance, 9 any
compromise of the core principle is problematic.2"
Some have suggested that the nullum crimen principle should be
interpreted flexibly in cases of transition from dictatorial to democratic
forms of government. The suggestion reduces the principle to rationales
unrelated to the circumstances of regime change, such as "the special trust
reposed in criminal statutes when these have been enacted by a democratic
legislature required to respect fundamental rights," ' or the need for an
existing legal system to guarantee a prospective freedom to act without fear

of being unpredictably subjected to punishment.22 But important as such
rationales may be, they are not exhaustive.
Indeed, regime change may be the most important context for the
18. ICCPR Art. 15(1), 15(2), supra note 13; see also European Conventionfor the
ProtectionoffHuman Rights andFundamentalFreedoms,213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art. 7 (1), 7 (2)
(1950) (containing virtually identical language). The reference to "general principles of law"
inserted by Art. 15(2) is properly understood not as addingan additional category of crimes,
but as an interpretation of the sources of international law consistent with the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, Art. 38(l)(c).
19. See ICCPR Art. 15 (1), supra note 13 ("[n]or shall a heavier penalty be imposed
than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."). But
see CASSESE, supra note 17, at 157 ("[tihis principle is not applicable at the international
level," where statutory sentences do not exist). Although the overall principle of nonretroactivity in criminal law is most frequently referred to in shorthand as "nulla poena,"
this article will use the term "nullum crimen" to reinforce the emphasis on the prior
delimitation of the offenses themselves, rather than of the penalties.
20. The core principle itself, of course, does not demand complete rigidity. In any
system of criminal justice, real cases reveal gray areas that call for judicial clarification, and
such clarification necessarily entails some retroactivity in the delimitation of offenses. The
problem comes, not in bending rules to effectuate their manifest purposes, but in
superimposing new purposes at odds with previous understandings.
21. Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz v. Federal Republic of Germany,49 I.L.M. 773, para.
22 (European Court of Human Rights 2001).
22. Id. This is a major theme in the work of Lon L. Fuller. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism andFidelity to Law: A Reply to ProfessorHart,71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958);
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press 1964).
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nullum crimen principle's application. Exercises of public power are often
morally controversial; acts that a regime's opponents may regard as morally
tantamount to criminality may at the same time be regarded by a regime's
supporters as morally permissible, or even imperative. Positive law serves
the indispensable function of establishing a provisional resolution of such
controversies, so that individuals (officials and non-officials) can know
where they stand in the scheme of public order that undergirds, at the given
moment, the society's pursuit of its basic tasks. Even where one can justly
criticize these individuals for failing to conform to moral imperatives
unreflected in the positive law of the time and place, one cannot justly
disregard their reliance on then-prevalent standards. To subject persons to
the pillory of criminal prosecution for failing to anticipate the refutation of
their government's moral position-a position that must be presumed to
have been held by some critical mass of the population sufficient to maintain
the efficacy of the old order, at least for the time being - is to scapegoat
individuals for circumstances endemic to the human condition. Such
punishment, even where undertaken in the name of an objectively correct
conception of human dignity, works its own deprivation of human dignity.
Moreover, even where ex post facto criminal lawmaking is not
substantively unfair, it undermines the ethos of legal constraint in the
exercise of power. Systems that eschew the rule of law do so in the name
of a "material justice" that is best served by unconstrained exertions of
discretionary authority.23 The rule-of-law tradition is, by contrast, distrustful
of such empowered moralism, however righteous its exertions may appear
in a given instance. Juridical rationalization of extralegal measures
establishes a principle that, to borrow from Justice Jackson, "lies about like
a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward
'
a plausible claim of an urgent need."24
While most observers (this author
included) accept the general proposition that all human beings, everywhere
and always, are chargeable with knowledge of the existence, validity, and
applicability of certain minimum standards of humane conduct, irrespective
of the applicable positive law, the potential for fierce disagreement over the
application of this proposition in particular contexts (as between, say, those
sympathetic to the victorious, and others to the defeated, cause) supports an
insistence on fixed standards, at least when trading on the idea of a
23. Instructive on this point is INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF
THE THIRD REICH 68-81 (trans. D. Schneider, 1991).
24. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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distinctively legal form of justice.
None of this is to deny that some moral clashes exceed the scope of
those ordinary to the harsh realities of the human condition, and call for
extraordinary responses despite the above considerations. But given the
developments in international criminal law since Nuremberg, which have
established a modicum of consensus on the criteria for clear-cut cases of
international crime, it is much harder today than in the past to substantiate
a pressing need to breach the nullum crimen norm.
The primary significance of nullum crimen in the current period is in
application, not to the retroactive creation of new crimes, but to the
retroactive nullification of defenses. Most violations of the physical integrity
of the person presumptively constitute criminal offenses in almost all legal
systems, and therefore presumptively count as "criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations" under
ICCPR Article 15(2).2" These "universal" presumptions in no way amount,
however, to a universal conception of criminality, given the absence of a
legal consensus on which presumptive violations may count as a legitimate
and proportionate means to a compelling end. Where the act in question fell
within a justification or prerogative recognized by the legal system then and
there in force, the act squarely "did not constitute a criminal offence under
national . . . law," irrespective of any general prohibition that would
otherwise pertain.26 The legal system's recognition of the defense may be
express, or it may be manifested in patterns of practice that reflect a
prevailing interpretation of written enactments.
IV. RETROACTIVE STANDARDS IN THE EAST GERMAN LEADERS CASE

In its 2001 Krenz decision,27 the European Court of Human Rights
grappled with the nullum crimen principle in reviewing the post-unification
25. InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights, supra note 13, at Art. 15(2).

26. Id. at Art. 15(1). Retroactive nullification of defenses, while always problematic,
is less so where the defense pertains merely to the mitigation of the defendant's
responsibility for having committed a concededly unjustified act. See Joshua Dressler,
Exegesis ofthe Law ofDuress:Justifying the Excuse and Searchingfor its ProperLimits, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1349 n.124 (1989) (defenses based on the doctrine of excuse, while

sheltering the actor from blame on ground of diminished agency, concede that the act itself
was unjustifiable and ought not to have been done).
27. Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 49 I.L.M. 773
(European Court of Human Rights 2001).
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criminal convictions in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of former
German Democratic Republic (GDR) leader Egon Krenz and other former
GDR officials. These officials had issued orders concerning the use of
deadly force against "border violators"-East German nationals who sought
to flee the GDR over the Berlin Wall or across the inter-German border.28
Tht ofEZI'als wvrez viatd
~
tz zzvtmwA Ikttimat h&a&Az.
(a crime that, unsurprisingly, existed under GDR law), in disregard of
defenses based on the established anti-emigration policies of the East
German state. 9 The case raises an important set of questions about what
constitutes retroactive nullification of a defense, and when, if ever, such
nullification is consistent with human rights and the rule of law.
In the several FRG courts that had considered the issues prior to the
defendants' application to the European Court of Human Rights, three
distinct lines of argument emrerged in support of the convictions. The first
line of argument-the one upheld by the Court-asserted that GDR law
itself, interpreted properly according to its terms rather than as skewed by
the regime's political domination of legal institutions, condemns the border
enforcement orders as criminal acts. The second line of argument, operating
both independently of and in conjunction with the first, was that the GDR's
obligations as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and under customary international human rights law precluded any
legal justification for the enforcement orders. The third line of argument,
invoking the post-World War II jurisprudence of Gustav Radbruch, asserted
that, to the extent that the positive law of the GDR furnished a justification
of the enforcement orders, such law should be "disapplied" as "intolerably
inconsistent with justice." 0
All three of these arguments merit close scrutiny, for they are
archetypical. All three invoke ideas that could justify, in the right
circumstances, sustaining a conviction of high officials of a human-rightsviolating state. All three, however, are bad arguments as applied to this
28. Estimates of the death toll over the twenty-eight year period range from the FRG
Government's official estimate of 264 to advocacy group estimates of over 900. Krenz, 49
I.L.M. 773 at para. 13.
29. Id.
30. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 22. For a thoughtful comparison ofthe jurisprudence
of post-Cold War and post-World War II prosecutions in Germany, including the
invocations of"Radbruch's formula," see Andrew Emanuel Tauber, Tyranny on Trial: The
Politicsof Natural Law and Legal Positivism in the FederalRepublic ofGermany (1997)

(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mass. Inst. of Technology) (on file with author).
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case, and illustrate the jurisprudential sleights of hand that courts fixated on
"ending impunity"-including, ultimately, the European Court of Human
Rights-are disposed to commit.
A. Retroactivity through the Reinterpretationof Positive Law
In 1961, in an effort to halt the massive emigration of its nationals to its
Western rival-roughly two and a half million since 19493 '-East Germany
built the Berlin Wall and implemented a set of draconian border regulations.
In the eyes of the GDR regime's opponents, East and West, these measures
symbolized the tyranny and cruelty of the Communist system, and were a
focal point of the ideological conflict that marked the Cold War era.
Whatever else may be said of the harshness of these measures, their
cruelty was not gratuitous. The GDR was faced with a structural
predicament that had no straightforward solution: (i) the GDR bordered on
the FRG, a more prosperous state that offered GDR nationals automatic
citizenship, that posed no cultural or linguistic barriers to entry, and to which
many GDR nationals had familial connections; (ii) in addition to being less
prosperous, the GDR was committed, as part of its raison d'etre, to
obliging its most capable and productive workers (to whom it had provided
education and training) to contribute their productivity to its social project for
highly limited rewards, thereby intensifying the threat of a debilitating
"brain"; (iii) a collapse of the GDR's economic and social project would
have led during this period, not to democratization and peaceful reunification
with the FRG, but to renewed Soviet occupation and heightened
international tensions. The GDR's vital interests manifestly depended on
foreclosing its nationals' option to emigrate, and indeed, the anti-emigration
measures largely succeeded in stabilizing (albeit arguably at an
unsatisfactory level) the economic and social life of the country.32
The Krenz case turns on the following order issued by the GDR
National Defense Council to border guard units: "The unit. . .will ensure
the security of the GDR's State border[;] ... its duty is not to permit border
crossings, to arrest border violators or to annihilate them and to protect the
State border at all costs."33 The border control policy contained significant
31. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 13.
32. LAURENCE H. MCFALLS, COMMUNISM'S COLLAPSE, DEMOCRACY'S DEMISE?
THE CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EAST GERMAN REVOLUTION 31-35

33. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 19.

(1995).
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ambiguities, as it was embodied in a multiplicity of directives-public and
secret, express and implied. There were, in addition, various changes over
time, most notably the removal in the 1980s of anti-personnel mines and
automatic-fire systems. Nonetheless, the policy's essential logic was
relatively overt and stable: it purported to eschew the "unnecessary" use of
deadly force, 34 but included within "necessity" the prevention ("at all costs")
of any unauthorized border crossing. Although some authorizations and uses
of deadly force at the border may not truly have constituted the least-drastic
available means to the end, FRG courts consistently deemed all of the
authorizations and uses of deadly force to have been disproportionate, not
for having been unnecessary to the prevention of border crossings, but for
having given priority to that goal over the safeguarding of human life.31
Can these measures properly be said to have been illegal under GDR
law? In analyzing the law of the GDR regime, not only as it operated in
practice, but also as it presented itself in principle, one must acknowledge
at the outset the distinctive jurisprudence (to put it too kindly, perhaps) of
"socialist legality" that governed legal interpretation.
In a liberal-democratic society, legislation represents the democratic
outcome of legitimate competition among a plurality of interests and values,
and the constitution represents the basic structure of the democratic polity
within which that competition proceeds. Both set standards-independent
of, and potentially adverse to, executive discretion-that are invoked to hold
the executive apparatus to account.
Socialist legality, conversely, recognized no legitimately-competing
interests and values, and therefore did not envisage law as a binding
accommodation to be imposed as a bridle on executive authority. Rather,
both legislation and the constitution were understood as reflections of an
essential unity of interests and values-as expressed abstractly in the
ideology and concretely in the policies of the ruling party-that legislative,
executive, and judicial organs (not "branches") alike were bound to serve.
Law was understood as an instrument of, not a check on, the party's
express purposes (with enactments often incorporating those purposes by
reference), and was to be interpreted teleologically in light of those
34. See id. at para. 60.
35. To the extent that secret orders called for uses of deadly force beyond what was
needed to prevent border crossings, they can properly said to have contravened the GDR's
espoused legal standards, and their issuers can justly be found criminally liable. What makes
the cases jurisprudentially problematic is precisely that they did not turn on such a finding.
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purposes.36
It is frequently objected that this scheme did not represent "legality" at
all, and that the GDR was an Unrechtsstaat, a lawless state. That
characterization, if apt, would at any rate prove too much for present
purposes, for the burden lies with the prosecution to establish that the
defendants violated law applicable at the time and place of their acts. A
better characterization is that the GDR rejected the concept of "the rule of
law," which ascribes to law (i.e., to legal processes and to the culture of
legal interpretation) an autonomy from political authority. That rejection is,
indeed, the essence of what it means to call the GDR a "dictatorship" (as
opposed to another form of authoritarian state). Law has many social
functions, including the control of corrupt or renegade public officials, that
GDR law purported (though perhaps often failed) to fulfill. Read in context,
however, GDR law did not purport to hold the highest levels of officialdom
accountable to any legal standard exogenous to the value system of the
ruling party.
If one regards the nullum crimen principle as fundamental to the
propriety of a criminal conviction, this insight is indispensable. The
applicable GDR statutes established a justification for the use of deadly
force "to prevent the imminent commission or continuation of an offence
'
which appears in the circumstances to constitute a serious crime."37
In the
abstract, the statutory scheme could plausibly be read to exclude from
"serious crimes" unarmed solo efforts to transgress the border-even

36. Tauber, supranote 30, at 158. Tauber draws roughly the same conclusion about the
natuse of GDP, Iaw. Id. Vo = abovatix4o
6 ZR"soi,',stegaiv," see HiXOtit I. BERMAN,
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 277-311, 363-84 (rev'd

ed., Harvard Univ. Press, 1963); see also Franciszek Przetacznik, The Socialist Conception
of Human Rights, 13 REVUE BEL6E DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 238, 246 (1977) ("the

Socialist State, as an incarnation of the totality of the working people, coordinates the
interests of society and of the individual and creates the conditions indispensable to the
formation of unity between the rights and duties of man and citizen"); VENIAMN CHIRKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 30 (1985) ("in place of the

bourgeois individualistic conception of the freedom of the individual, there exists under
socialism another [concept of freedom] ... as inseparably bound up with the unity of the
basic interests of society, the state, the collective and the individual."); EVGENI M.
CHEKHARIN, THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER DEVELOPED SOCIALISM 209-10

(1977) ("political freedoms ... are exercised in the USSR exclusively in the people's
interest" and "may not be used to harm the cause of peace, democracy and socialism.").
37. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 38.
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38
'
though one of the statutory criteria, "committed with particular intensity,"
arguably describes any deliberate encounter with the overt risks that the
border fortifications posed. But the pattern of official (including judicial)
practice clearly established the inclusion of border transgression within the
authoritative construction of "serious crime."39 Whatever may be said for
the nominal supremacy of the GDR Constitution over legislation and
customary practice (Art. 89(2)), the Constitution's affirmations of the rights,
dignity, and liberty of the person need to be read through the lens of the
overarching ideology and in keeping with the acknowledgment, in Article 1,
of the party's leading role. The border policy constituted controlling law
from the standpoint of the GDR's legal culture: as the European Court of
Human Rights admitted, the policy "was imposed on all organs of the GDR,
including its judicial bodies." '
On the other hand, if one regards the nullum crimen principle as a
formalistic obstacle in the way of an unambiguously desirable outcome, little
creativity is required to circumvent the obstacle. East German law's basic
language and doctrinal structure resembled those of the liberal West; once
emptied of its ideological content and idiosyncratic principles of
interpretation (and therefore of its real substance), its enactments provide
a ready basis for condemning the very exercises of power that it
systematically accepted and affirmed in practice.
This jurisprudential maneuver has been fittingly described as

at para. 59. Art. 213(3) of the 1979 GDR Criminal Code defines "serious cases"
38. Id.

of illegal border crossing as cases punishable by more than "up to two years." Id. "Serious
crimes" are defined more broadly in Article 1(3) to include:

Attacks dangerous to society against the sovereignty of the Germatt Democratic
offenses against the German Democratic Republic[,] and deliberately
Republic ....
committed life-endangering criminal acts. Likewise considered serious crimes are
offences dangerous to society which are deliberately committed against the rights
and interests of citizens, socialist property and other rights and interests of
society, which constitute serious violations of socialist legality and which, on that
account, are punishable by at least two years' imprisonment ....
Id. at para. 35. Given the vagueness and ideologically-loaded nature of these terms, it is far
from implausible, even absent the peculiarly teleological interpretive method prevalent in
socialist systems, that the language provided a statutory justification of the National
Defense Council's order. See Julian Rivers, The InterpretationandInvalidity of UnjustLaws,
IN RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 47-48 (David

Dyzenhaus, ed. 1999).
39. Rivers, supra note 38, at 47-48.
40. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 87.
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"reinterpretive positivism": the imputation of an anachronistic liberal spirit
to the law of a non-liberal regime. 4' The European Court of Human Rights
embraced this approach with alacrity, holding that the FRG courts "cannot
be criticised for applying and interpreting the legal provisions in force at the
material time in light of the principles governing a State subject to the rule
of law."' 2
Such a substitution of interpretive method-attributing to words an
"objective" meaning at variance with the meaning that they had in the legal
culture in which they were embedded-is incompatible with the nullum
crimen principle. No country's legal enactments can be said to have
meanings so objective that their terms can be applied without regard to their
context and to the overall framework within which they are routinely
interpreted. By such a method one could, to take an easy example, readily
interpret many clauses of the United States Constitution to condemn
generations of established U.S. governmental practice-thereby delivering
a great surprise to public officials (and cooperating citizens) who had every
reason to believe that their conduct, however much at odds with a hostile
outsider's semantic analysis of the Constitution's terms, was legally
authorized. Nothing of substance follows from the Court's observation that
"anyone could have foreseen that, in the event of a change in regime in the
GDR, these acts might constitute criminal offenses" 3 ; one might as well

have said that FRG officials were on notice that many of their acts would
be prosecutable, through a similar process of legal reinterpretation, in the

41. See Tauber, supra note 30, at 28-29.
42. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 81. The Court continued:
Contrary reasoning would run counter to the very principles on which the system
of protection put in place by the [European Convention of Human Rights] is built.
The framers of the Convention referred to those principles in the preamble to the
Convention when they affirmed "their profound belief in those fundamental
freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other
by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they
depend" and declared that they were "like-minded" and had "a common heritage
of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law."
Id. at para. 83. Given that the GDR was never amongthe "like-minded" states that embarked
on this project, this passage illustrates the distortions introduced by the transformation of
human rights from a shield into a sword.
43. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 48.
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event of the East winning the Cold War.'
The Court's misstep has its roots, though, in a valid idea that would
have justified the desired outcome in a somewhat different context. The
valid idea is that nullum crimen is satisfied where officials, who succeeded
in establishing a practice of impunity through the exercise of their own raw
power, are held to the legal standards that their regime actually purported
to observe, and that it thus traded on in its quest for legitimation. If
hypocrisy is, as the saying goes, "the tribute that vice pays to virtue," that
tribute properly defeats any claim that the conduct in question had not been
established to be vice. Regard for positive law should not be conflated with
a cynical realism about what counts as law; positive law is not reducible to
whatever the powerful can get away with. Had the GDR officials' impunity
been owing to covert or thuggish measures that had distorted or impeded
the implementation of the GDR's own purported legal standards, it would
have been quite proper, after the regime change, to hold those officials to
an undistorted version of the applicable standards.
The Court's fundamental error lay in regarding the characteristic East
German mode of legal interpretation as self-consciously immoral or amoral,
rather than as an authentic expression of an ideology, with some substantial
following, that was in moral disagreement with liberalism. Hypocritical
though it was in other respects, the GDR was not a faux liberal regime, but
an insistently anti-liberal one. It indeed used political and legal rhetoric
44. The Court's statement reveals an affinity for the FRG legal system's tendency,
more express in the pre-reunification era but continuing tacitly afterward, to deny the
sovereignty of the GDR. See Peter E. Quint, Judging the Past: The Prosecutionof East
German Border Guards and the GDRChainofCommand, 61 REV. OF POLITICS 303,32627 (1999). Where a territory is under the defacto control of an illegitimate regime, the
standard judicial approach is to acknowledge the legal status of public acts routine to
territorial administration (under a doctrine known as "implied mandate"), but to deny the
legal status of public acts that reflect the distinctive agenda of the illegitimate authority.
ROTH, supra note 14, 152-59. This approach suggests that those acting specifically to
enforce the Communist order were on notice that upon restoration of legitimate rule, their
acts could be construed as crimes on the basis of FRG standards, irrespective of
authorization by the illegitimate regime. See Tauber, supra note 30, at 143 (stating that
"[alccording to the court (in a 1964 prosecution of a border guard who ended up in the
West], the East German border regime served no defensible purpose; its sole rationale was
the maintenance of communist tyranny."). Sincethe GDR's admission to the United Nations
in 1973 established beyond cavil its status as a sovereign entity for the purposes of
international law, no residue of this doctrine should be allowed to bolster the prosecution of
former GDR officials.
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reflective of an intellectual heritage held in common with liberal states, but
not, in the main, to camouflage the regime's deviation from liberal legalism.
Rather, it attempted, through this rhetoric, to present its distinctive policies
as the genuine fulfillment of the same underlying values that liberal states
espoused but had, in the Marxist-Leninist view, betrayed. However much
cynicism and corruption marked the system in practice, the regime
consistently sought legitimation (as "the better Germany") by appeal to a set
of normative principles sharply at variance with those of the West.45
Whatever its other deficits, the East German regime did not lack for
moral rationalizations of its basic structure and functioning. Although some
policies were kept covert precisely because they defied even the
Communist talent for rationalization, this was not so of the most essential
aspects of the border control system (though the regime did go to some
length to conceal the extent of that system's human consequences).
Moreover, the interpretation of the individual's legal protections in light of
an authoritarian-socialist hierarchy of values was a point of principle, openly
announced. One might argue that this brazen stance opens the ex-GDR
officials to attack on other grounds, but, however that may be, it is error to
condemn them on the basis of an authentic reading of GDR law.
It is, of course, possible to insist that authenticity is beside the point. In
his concurrence in the European Court's Krenz judgment, Judge Levits
contended that "there is no room for other solutions" than "to apply the 'old'
law, set by the previous non-democratic regime, according to the approach
to interpretation and application of the law which is inherent in the new
democratic political order. 4 6 In his view, "[u]sing any other method of
applying the law .. .would damage the very core of the ordre public of a

democratic State."*
But it is hard to see why this is so in cases where nullification of unjust
law operates as a sword rather than as a shield. To be sure, a liberaldemocratic system must refuse applications of illiberal legal standards that
would deny individuals the benefits of liberal justice. The anachronistic legal
interpretation at issue here, however, is precisely what works the denial of
liberal justice (at least prima facie) by negating nullum crimen, itself a
principle at "the very core of the ordre public of a democratic state." If
45. For an elaboration of the theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist legal norms, see
ROTH, supranote 14, at 75-120.
46. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 para. 7 (Levits, J.,
concurring).
47. Id. at para. 8 (Levits, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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there is a danger of eroding that core, it far more plausibly emanates from
indulging the retroactive expansion of criminal liability in pursuit of material
justice, a quintessential practice of illiberal regimes.
B. Retroactivity through the Direct Application of Unincorporated
InternationalLaw

An alternative theory underlying the FRG court judgments was that
since GDR regulations restricting emigration violated international law, the
state's effort to enforce them could provide no justification for the
authorization or use of deadly force.48 This theory is rooted in either of two

propositions: (i) that international human rights law by itself operates to
nullify defenses recognized by GDR law; or (ii) that international human
rights law was incorporated into GDR law so as to eliminate the defenses
at issue from the corpus of GDR law. The first embodies a mistaken
understanding of the interrelation of international and domestic law, and the
second embodies an unjustified conclusion about GDR law's reception of
international law.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which the GDR was a party, provides that "the inherent right
to life ...

shall be protected by law," and that no one "shall be arbitrarily

' Article 12 further provides, inter alia, that:
deprived of his life."49

Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own ....
[That right] shall not be subjected to any restrictions except those
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.5 0
Read together, the two Articles can be compellingly construed to condemn
the GDR's border enforcement system as a violation of its obligations under
48. SeeKrenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 para. 20 (covering the 1994 decision of the Federal Court
of Justice in the cases of Streletz and Kessler; see also PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT
UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AT GERMAN UNIFICATION 200-01 (Princeton,
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1997).
49. ICCPR, supra note 13, Art. 6(1).
50. Id. at 14, Art. 12.
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international human rights law. If that were the question posed to the FRG
courts or to the European Court of Human Rights, one could scarcely object
to it being answered in the affirmative.
But this is precisely not the question at issue. The existence of legal
obligations to uphold internationally-recognized human rights does not, ipso
facto, affect the legal norms applicable to individual conduct, even conduct
undertaken in an official capacity. Except with respect to the limited set of
conventions and customary doctrines establishing criminal liability for
violations under color of state authority-under mere "color" of that
authority because states have renounced not only the practices themselves,
but also, expressly or tacitly, the legal capacity to authorize
human rights law is binding only on states as
them 5 1-intemational
corporative entities, and is transformed into directly applicable standards of
individual conduct only through the enactments of domestic authorities.52
Individual states may choose, through a blanket constitutional or legislative
incorporation of treaties and the customary law of nations, to integrate
international obligations automatically into directly applicable domestic law,
thereby adopting a fully "monist" conception of the relationship between
domestic and international law. To the extent that they do not do so,
however, the relationship must be presumed to be "dualist," with domestic
law operating on a separate plane from international obligations until and
unless specific domestic enactments incorporate international legal
standards.
Moreover, for states to adopt international obligations does not entail
renunciation of the ultimate authority to violate those obligations for the sake
of what they deem, unilaterally, to be the national interest, thereby incurring
51. Thus, "[h]e who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law." JudicialDecisions: InternationalMilitary Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentence, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
52. For example, in the domestic law of the United States, many treaties, such as the
United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are
considered "non-self-executing." They bind the United States on the international plane, but
they have no direct effect on internal legal obligations. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 38
Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (recognizing that "[a] treaty does not automatically
supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are selfexecuting."); U.S. ICCPR Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 138 CONG. REc.
S4781 (1992), Decl. I (Senate Declaration that the ICCPR's substantive provisions are non-

self-executing).
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whatever sanctions the international community may duly inflict on the
state. 53 International obligations do not extinguish sovereign prerogative, just
as sovereignty in no way precludes obligations that constrain governance in
the ordinary course.5 4 Even in the classic writings of Bodin and Hobbes,
sovereignty entails, not freedom from duties as to character of public order,
but a monopoly of the last word on what counts as public order.55 As the
neo-Bodinian Carl Schmitt explained, sovereignty does not negate the
existence of a legal rule; rather, "[s]overeign is he who decides on the
exception." 6 "If the individual states no longer have the power to declare
the exception, . . . then they no longer enjoy the status of states." 7
States are liable for violations of international law, but it does not follow
that the violation legally nullifies the offending "act of state." This
difference is significant, since individuals are often in the position of acting
under a legal regime that violates international law.58 Executive or legislative
53. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREGIN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 168
(Mineola, N.Y., Foundation Press, 1972) ("International law . . . recognizes the
power-though not the right-to break a treaty and abide the international consequences.").
54. One way to explain this phenomenon is to assert that international law remains a
creature of sovereign states, rather than vice versa. But even if international law is taken to
be the juridical foundation of sovereign prerogative, it does not follow that the protections
and immunities conferred on states become legally ineffective whenever states violate their
legal obligations. And a good thing, too, for if innocence were a condition of inviolability,
strong states would always be able to fmdj ustifications for intrusions upon weak states. An
instructive illustration is the U.S. invocation of alleged Nicaraguan human rights violations
to justify the contrawar, a move soundly repudiated by the International Court of Justice.
MilitaryandParamilitaryActivities
(Nicaraguav. UnitedStates), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, paras.
267-68 (1986). Similarly, no international law violations that may have emanated from the
U.S. Embassy in Teheran prior to November 4, 1979 could have licensed Iran's violation of
the Embassy's immunities. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff
in Teheran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. REP. 3, paras. 81-87 (1980).
55. JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 30 (M.L. Tooley, Basil
Blackwell Oxford 1955) (1576) (bk. I, ch. 8) (articulating that a prince is bound by the
covenants he undertakes except when, in his unilateral judgment,"they cease to satisfy the
claims ofjustice."); THOMAS HOBOES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS ONE AND Two 254-44 (The
Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651) (ch. 29) (recognizing the sovereign is bound by natural law,
albeit subject to unilateral interpretation).
56. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF

The MIT Press 1985) (1922).
57. Id. at 11.
58. In the United States, for example, the internal legal effects of even "self-executing"
treaties are nullified to the extent of subsequent inconsistent Congressional enactments.
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab,
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acts frequently license subordinate officials (and ordinary citizens) to
engage in forcible or otherwise harmful acts that would, but for such
license, be deemed criminal, and these exculpatory enactments may violate
the state's international obligations. Where U.S. officials implement
enactments that violate "non-self-executing" international obligations, they
are acting, not under mere "color" of sovereign authority (as where the
enactment violates the Constitution), but under actual sovereign authority.
Invocations of international law to nullify the legal effects of such
enactments, thereby to hold state-licensed actors legally responsible to
international standards as though those standards were directly applicable,
come into conflict with the nullum crimen principle. The same conclusion
applies as well in favor of the highest officials who, in exercising a
legislative or executive function, undertake the sovereign decision, within the
scope of their authority under the domestic regime, to breach the state's
corporate obligations.
Again, this is by no means to deny that some acts committed within the
scope of state authority are, by international treaty and custom, excepted
from the substantive immunities that sovereignty ordinarily confers upon
those acting in its service.59 These exceptions are an affirmation that certain
core moral principles are so indispensable to legality's essential purposes as
to transcend ideology, culture, and historical circumstance; violations of
those principles are transcendent crimes.'

HeadMoneyCases, 112 U.S. 580,598-99(1884). Any effect of customary international law
in U.S. law (under the rubric of "federal common law") is displaced by a "controlling
executive or legislative act." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For an
instructive summary of the limited status of international law in U.S. law, see Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
59. "The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the
representatives of a state [by excluding personal responsibility under the doctrine of
sovereignty], cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international
law." JudicialDecisions: InternationalMilitary Tribunal(Nuremberg), supra note 51, at
220-21. The Tribunal's rhetoric in regard to crimes "committed by men, not by abstract
entities"is sometimes taken out of context to imply the personal responsibility of officials
for breaches ofa state's legal obligationsmore broadly,but nothing in the passage, nor in the
surrounding circumstances, suggests that broader meaning. Id. at 221.
60. These crimes are frequently discussed as violations of peremptory norms of
international law, or jus cogens. Although they may well be that, the conflation of
international crimes andjus cogens is a category error; ajus cogens violation is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition of an international crime. For instance, United States
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But if this character were to be ascribed to human rights violations
generally (i.e., if all positive enactments that have authorized harsh
measures in the service of perpetuating an illiberal public order were to be
retroactively or extraterritorially invalidated), vast numbers of public officials
(and private citizens who cooperate with them) would be vulnerable to
criminal prosecution, and even more to tort claims, once subject to the
jurisdiction of an unfriendly regime. A U.S. national need only imagine the
fate of fellow citizens who participate in governmental policies pertaining to

the death penalty, imprisonment, immigration, or homelessness-all subject
to international condemnation that may at some point be reflected in a
judicial determination-to value the distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated international legal standards. 6
It appears that the GDR legal system, like that of the United States,
combined elements of the monist and dualist approaches to the relationship
between international and domestic law. On the one hand, Article 51 of the
GDR Constitution required the passage of implementing legislation for treaty
provisions to have the status of domestic law; the ICCPR, as a ratified but
unincorporated treaty, thus, had no such status. 62 On the other hand, Article
95 of the GDR Criminal Code appears to work a relevant incorporation:
Any person whose conduct violates human or fundamental rights,
international obligations or the national sovereignty of the German

military assistance to Nicaraguan insurgents in the 1980s has been authoritatively (and
correctly)pronounced to have been a violation oflus cogens. See MilitaryandParamilitary
Activities,supranote 54, at paras. 190, 228, 238. But it does not follow that the individuals
responsible for the policy are subject to criminal liability, let alone that the policy was
something other than an authentic act of state. Conversely, treaties may establish the
criminality of acts committed under color of state authority, yet only within the jurisdiction
of the consenting states parties.
61. The last five paragraphs, as well as other parts of this section, have been adapted
from a previous article that attempts a broader theoretical statement on the relationship
between state sovereignty and human rights. See Brad R. Roth, Anti-Sovereigntism, Liberal
Messianism, andExcesses in the DriveAgainst Impunity, 12 FINMISH Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 3233 (2001).
62. Peter E. Quint, The Border Guard Trials and the East German Past-Seven
Arguments, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 541, 554 (2000). See also Rivers, supra note 39, at 51
(stating "the majority of commentators were fairly clear that the [GDR] system was
dualist," and therefore criticized FRG Federal Court of Justice "for misunderstanding the
East German system.").
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Democratic Republic may not plead ... statute law, an order or
written instructions in justification; he shall be held criminally

responsible.63
The European Court of Human Rights thus concluded: "Even supposing that
(individual criminal] responsibility cannot be inferred from..
international
instruments on the protection of human rights, it may be deduced from those
instruments when they are read together with Article 95 .... "
The Court's argument is plausible as a general proposition. Through
Article 95, the GDR clearly sought to assert for itself a standing, both in
strictly moral terms and as a member of the international community, that
contrasted sharply with that of the Third Reich. It can thus properly be held
to that assertion, opening the door to the nullification of defenses that might
otherwise have been available under GDR law.
Still, the Court's application of Article 95 to this case is highly
problematic. The Court takes the position, in regard to the GDR's
obligations under Article 12 of the ICCPR, that "it cannot be contended that
a general measure preventing almost the entire population of a State from
leaving was necessary to protect its security, or for that matter the other
interests mentioned [in Article 12(3)]. '"5 The GDR nonetheless did so
contend,' and was supported in that contention by the community of
socialist states, by reference to which the GDR oriented itself in
international affairs, and which constituted one of the three major blocs that
comprised the larger international community in the Cold War era.
Moreover, precisely because of the absence of state consent and
international consensus, the international system lacked the mechanisms for
generating an authoritative interpretation and binding application of either
the ICCPR or customary human rights law. If condemnation had come
from a genuine cross-section of the international community, the effect
might have been to cure this defect, but such unsystematic (not to say
partisan) condemnations as governments and non-governmental
organizations actually issued against the GDR's border practices cannot be
said to have amounted to a binding judgment. Whatever the Court's present
.

63. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at Streletz, Kessler; Krenz v. Federal Republic of Germany,
47 I.L.M. 773 (European Court of Human Rights 2001).

64. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 104.
65. Id. at para. 100.
66. See Rivers, supranote 38, at 48.
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view of the matter, the GDR, a non-party to the European Convention on
Human Rights, was not subject to the Court's judgment.
The point here is not to criticize the Court's conclusion that the GDR
border practices constituted an international wrong; this is certainly a
legitimate conclusion as an objective matter, even if a less obvious one than
is widety assumed. That conclusion, however, should not control the
retrospective interpretation of "human or fundamental rights" and
"international obligations" under Article 95 of the GDR Criminal Code.
Once again, any interpretation of GDR law that pretends to authenticity
must operate through the lens of "socialist legality." It is implausible that a
jurist operating in that jurisprudential context (again, putting aside all
corruption or coercion that may also have marked that system) would read
Article 95 to nullify a defense based on an interpretation of the GDR's
obligations that was controverted in the international system, that had been
rejected by the GDR's socialist allies, and that threatened the ruling party's
conception of the very national sovereignty considerations highlighted in the
same Article and throughout the Criminal Code.
Moreover, idiosyncracies of Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence aside, even
a rule-of-law-oriented domestic legal system's incorporation of international
law is not necessarily a license to impute to domestic law a controverted
interpretation of international norms. U.S. courts, for example,
systematically defer to Executive Branch interpretations of U.S.
international obligations.67
In sum, it is an imposition of ex post facto criminal law to impute a
nullification of defenses to the domestic incorporation of international law,
where the norm retrospectively deemed to have been incorporated reflects
the adverse side of an international legal controversy that, even if now
resolved, was unresolved at the time of the acts in question. The convoluted
67. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
"Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government
agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." Id. at
184-85. Moreover, U.S. courts have adopted some notably improbable interpretations of
treaty standards that would otherwise have empowered individuals vis-A-vis the Executive.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (U.S.-authorized
transborder abduction ofa Mexican national to stand trial in the U.S. does not violate U.S.Mexico extradition treaty); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (duty
of non-refoulement contained in treaty and in implementing legislation does not apply to
return of refugees to the country of their persecution where the refugees were intercepted
on the high seas).
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method does not alter the substance of the project.
C. Retroactivity through the Invocation of Natural Law
The fundamental problem with the first two methods of establishing the
criminality of GDR border practices is simpler than the elaborate discussion
above may suggest. Both methods seek to keep faith with the nullum
crimen principle by contending that the ex-officials violated norms that the
regime itself had espoused. But the GDR border practices, more than any
other Cold War-era phenomenon, precisely represented the overt clash of
values between East and West. The prosecutions are transparently an
effort to condemn Communism itself as an unjust system of public order,
and to hold individuals criminally accountable for forcibly implementing its
values. Although some of the border cases involved gratuitous uses of
force, these have not been the main focus, nor the main point, of the
prosecutorial project. The pro-prosecution arguments reviewed above-the
only bases for the convictions that the European Court was willing expressly
to adopt-are unpersuasive precisely because they are essentially
disingenuous, a fact that frustrates the prosecutions' strongest supporters
as much as it does their opponents.6'
At the heart of the prosecutions, as reflected in the FRG Federal
Constitutional Court's 1996 judgment in the cases of Streletz and Kessler,
is the counter-principle to nullum crimen known generally as "Radbruch's
formula" for the "disapplication" of positive law.6 9 That Court explicated the
68. See Tauber,supranote 30,at 186-99; see also Russell Miller, Rejecting Radbruch:
The European Court of Human Rights and the Crimes of the East German Leadership, 14
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 653 (2001).
69. Krenz, 49 1.L.M. 773 at para. 104. The Radbruch formula came most prominently
to the attention of English-speaking legal scholars in the course of the famous 1958 debate
between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller on the relationship between law and morality. H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism andthe Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 615-21
(1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to Professorflar4 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 648-61 (1958). A focal point of the debate was an FRG prosecution in 1949
of the wife of a World War I1German soldier. The woman, apparently for ulterior and
utterly non-ideological reasons, had informed the Nazi authorities of her husband's antiFuehrer grumblings, knowing (and indeed, intending) that this would lead to her husband's
arrest and death sentence. Id. at 652-53. Radbruch and Fuller, albeit for somewhat different
reasons, straightforwardly favored the nullification of defenses based on Nazi enactments
effectively authorizinglimitless punishment of even privately-expressed dissent, whereas
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formula as follows:
[P]ositive law should be disapplied only in absolutely exceptional
cases and that a merely unjust piece of legislation, which is
unacceptable on any enlightened view, may nevertheless, because
it remains inherently conducive to order, still acquire legal validity
and thus create legal certainty. . . . However, the period of National

Socialist rule had shown that the legislature was capable of
imposing gross "wrong" by statute . .

. ,

so that, where a statutory

provision was intolerably inconsistent with justice, that provision
should be disapplied from the outset ......
Whatever the abstract merits of nullifying atrocious exculpatory
enactments, the "intolerably inconsistent with justice" formula simply begs
the question: When is leaving an egregious wrongdoer unpunished more
intolerable than using law to punish someone whose acts, though objectively
immoral, were lawful-and therefore presumably considered by the
effective authorities and their supporters to be morally justified-when and
where committed? The formula is alluring in the realm of thought
experiments, where the mind that judges the propriety of licensing such
decisions is the same one that would be entrusted with the license to decide
the extent of objective immorality. 7' As an institutional matter, however, the
formula invites precisely the kind of subjective judgment, pertaining to the
exercise of power over the most fundamental human interests, that the rule
of law distrustfully precludes. This observation does not refute Radbruch's
formula, but does counsel caution in licensing its application.
The Nazi experience was an extraordinary circumstance that justified
an extraordinary response. Any suggestion of "moral equivalence" between
the GDR and Third Reich regimes is unsustainable. The GDR pursued an
ideological mission at odds with liberty and democracy, but however

Hart, while sympathetic to the prosecution, saw the case as presenting a troubling dilemma.
70. Krenz, 49 I.L.M. 773 at para. 22.
71. However much it may appear to the contrary, the argument herein is at no point
predicated on moral relativism. The entire discussion proceeds on the assumption that
universal moral truths both exist and are, in principle, humanly discernible. It nonetheless
emphasizes the endemic reality of moral disagreement on matters of the utmost seriousness,
even among the most intelligent, best-informed, and best-intentioned human beings. It
therefore pursues the most morally sound institutional response to that objective reality.
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misguided and corruptly implemented, that mission entailed no offenses even
remotely akin to the Third Reich's multiple genocides and pan-continental
aggression. The GDR participated in an international system of peaceful
coexistence, whereas the Third Reich set out to destroy, and did destroy,
such a system. The GDR regime ultimately--due in some measure to the
actions, or at least the forbearance, of Egon KrenzT;-yielded power
peaceably; the ouster of the Nazi regime came only as a result of the most
catastrophic war in human history.
Repugnant as the GDR border enforcement practices were, they were
designed to prevent otherwise-unpreventable violations of a law that was,
at least in terms of aggregate compliance, essential to the state's vital
interests. Moreover, the victims, while guilty of no act that can justly be
called immoral, willingly encountered a known risk, in defiance of multiple
warnings. Concededly, the use of deadly force in any one case appears
disproportionate to the harm to state interests posed by any one successful
border crossing, but a similar logic might equally condemn various
enforcement practices that can be found in liberal-democratic states. 3
Of course, solicitude for the vital interests of the GDR cannot be taken
as a given. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the border prosecutions
ultimately embody-and indeed, intend-a retrospective de-legitimation of
loyalty to the political project that the GDR represented. Yet although the
regime was widely unpopular, it should be remembered that many people

72. Ironically,by helpingto block the use of force against demonstrators in Leipzig and
then unseating the recalcitrant Erich Honecker in October 1989, Krenz likely prevented
much more bloodshed than that which the FRG prosecutors have managed to attribute to
him. The extent to which Krenz contributed affirmatively to the peaceful transition remains
controverted. See, e.g., MARY FULBROOK, ANATOMY OF DICTATORSHIP: INSIDE THE
GDR, 1949-1989 at 256-57 (Oxford University Press, 1995). "The main initiative [for the
decision to refrain from using force against the Leipzig demonstrators] appears to have been
taken by regional and local functionaries," though the decision was then "officially ratified
by the then security chief Egon Krenz." Id.
73. It is worthnotingthat from 1993 to 1997, the first four years of a stringent border
control regime instituted in Southern California, many more people died seeking to enter the
United States from Mexico than died seeking to leave East Germany in the twenty-eight
years of the Berlin Wall's existence; although the former deaths did not result from
shootings, they did result from known consequences of deliberate policies. See Peter
Andreas, Borderless Economy, Barricaded Border, 33 NACLA REPORT ON THE
AMERICAS, No. 3, 14, 17 (1999) (citingUniversity ofHouston study putting the four-year
death toll of would-be immigrants to the U.S. at 1,185).
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of good faith and sound intelligence supported that project. Their reasons,
however mistaken, were not inherently evil; indeed, the GDR, and the
Communist movement in general, invoked principles that had considerable
moral appeal." 4

Recourse to the retroactive nullification of exculpatory GDR law
makes, in effect, a remarkable claim for the particular set of liberaldemocratic norms that gained ascendancy in the 1990s: that these norms not
only have been everywhere and always correct, but so intuitive that anyone
who acted within an opposing normative system is chargeable with having
had constructive knowledge of their correctness. Such a claim more
properly befits illiberal systems, which characteristically regard dissidence
as unnatural and corrupt, and which employ open-ended penal laws to deny
legal protection to those manifesting base dispositions. Moreover, such a
claim repudiates-both retroactively and prospectively-the sovereign
equality of liberal and non-liberal states that has anchored the international
legal system, and more generally the idea of peaceful and respectful
accommodation among bearers of opposing conceptions of ptblic order.
In sum, all of the rationales offered for sustaining the convictions of
Krenz and his fellow high officials run afoul, not only of nullum crimen sine
lege as a technical matter, but of the fundamental considerations that the
nullum crimen norm represents. That the defendants may be said to have
assumed, by their ruthlessness, the risks of "victor's justice" does not affect
the impropriety of these convictions in a liberal-democratic legal system
bound to the highest standards of human rights observance.

V. LOOKING AHEAD: RETROACTIVITY AND THE DANGER OF POLITICAL
ABUSIF OF LEGAL PROCESSES
Not long ago, the rhetoric of human rights operated primarily as a shield,
not a sword. It was a language of resistance to power, not a language for
the exercise of power. As such, human rights rhetoric could afford to be
bold, sweeping, and imprecise, even in its legal formulations. The state-its

interests and its values-would inevitably be well-represented, both in
political fora and in court. Human rights advocates could concentrate on
rousing consciences to affirm the dignity of human beings menaced by the
7Soath, sua
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74. See Roth, supra note 14, at 75-120.
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jurisprudential (let alone policy) considerations; there was no real danger of
excess in promoting dignity-oriented constraint on state action. Therefore,
human rights scholars frequently set for themselves the goal of
substantiating the broadest and deepest claims of the human rights
movement, and nay-saying scholars often confronted moralistic criticism of
their efforts.
Such an attitude is maladaptive to the current period, in which human
rights are invoked to justify exercises of power, ranging from prosecutions
of former officials of adverse states to bombings, invasions, and
occupations. In this context, there is a danger that legal proceedings can be
transmogrified into festivals of self-righteousness, orchestrated not only to
designate scapegoats for international dissensus, but also to reveal the
fecklessness of those who counsel restraint and compromise in the face of
a certified evil.75
The retrospective prosecutions of GDR leaders in FRG courts, though
by no means closely resembling that grim image, 76 had hints of both aspects.
The post-unification determination to affix the stain of criminality to leading
GDR figures led, not only to the Berlin Wall convictions (which, however
legally dubious, responded to a genuine human interest in affirming the
dignity of the victims), but also to the conviction (ultimately overturned
pursuant to a Federal Constitutional Court judgment) of spymaster Markus
Wolf for espionage activities similar to those conducted by his FRG
intelligence counterparts, and to the truly bizarre conviction of former GDR
Prime Minister Hans Modrow, who had presided over the Communists'
relinquishment of power in 1990 and had remained influential in postunification politics, for having earlier falsified results in an alreadyundemocratic GDR election.77 Moreover, retrospective criticism of Western
accommodationist policies toward the GDR appears to have been at least
some part of the motivation for the prosecutions.
The danger that human rights-based prosecutions may be politically
75. In addition to hardening positions (akin to the insistence that one "never negotiate
with terrorists"), attributions of criminality to adverse regimes tend to place enforcement
demands on international institutions that such institutions characteristically cannot bear,
opening the door to unilateral exertions that can be rationalized as implementation of
universal principles.
76. For a sympathetic account of the prosecutions, see A. JAMES MCADAMS,
JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY 23-54 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,

2001).
77. See QUINT, supra note 48, at 206-14.
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abused highlights the need to demand rigor in adherence to exculpatory
principles such as nullum crimen sine lege. In all but the most atrocious
cases, fairness precludes holding individuals criminally accountable to
standards, however objectively correct, that demand the individual to have
disregarded the prevailing normative conception of the time and place, for
this is more than can justly be demanded of most human beings on either
side of a political and ideological divide. The integrity of law must be
guarded against the temptation, which may become more widespread as
human rights-based prosecutions increase, to use legal processes to pillory
such individuals for the sake of a political message-and a dubious political
message at that.

